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We investigate how network structure influences evolutionary games on networks. We
extend the pair approximation to study the effects of degree fluctuation and clustering of the
network. We find that a larger fluctuation of the degree is equivalent to a larger mobility of
the players. In addition, a larger clustering coefficient is equivalent to a smaller number of
neighbors.
§1. Introduction
Evolutionary games on networks have recently attracted attention in evolution-
ary biology, behavioral science and statistical physics. In particular, an intensively
studied question is how network structure influences the evolution of cooperative be-
havior in a dilemma situation (for regular lattices1)–6) and complex networks7)–14)).
Nowak and May observed that cooperation behavior can be enhanced in the pris-
oner’s dilemma game on a lattice network.2) Contrastingly, Hauert and Doebeli
found that network structure often inhibits cooperation behavior in the snowdrift
game.6) Because most of these papers are based on numerical simulations, it is not
clear how the network architecture affects the evolution in general cases. The pur-
pose of this study is to establish a theoretical formula describing the network effect
in evolutionary game theory.
In this study, we focus on the influence of the average degree, degree fluctua-
tions and clustering structure on the asymptotic result. To analyze these effects,
we apply the pair approximation technique. The pair approximation is a useful tool
for analysis of model ecosystems, because it can predict the population dynamics
more accurately than the mean-field approximation.15)–18) The procedure for the
pair approximation is often so complicated that it is carried out by numerical calcu-
lations. Here, to obtain an analytical solution, we propose novel procedures for the
pair approximation.
§2. Games on Networks
A game on network is defined as follows. Let us consider a static network. Each
node of network is occupied by an individual. Every individual plays games with
its neighbors and reproduces depending on the score of games. Furthermore, we
introduce migration of the players on the static network to clear network effects.
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In this study, we consider four types of networks. First, we study the case of
random regular graphs, in which all nodes have the same degree (the number of
neighbors) z, and links are random (i.e. no correlations, clustering, etc.).19) We as-
sume z > 2 so that the networks are not divided into many disconnected components.
Next, we expand the study to the case of networks in which the degree is distributed:
Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graphs19) and Baraba´si-Albert scale-free networks.20) Finally,
to study the clustering effect, we consider random regular graphs with a high level
of clustering.21)
Consider a symmetric game with two strategies, A and B, with the payoff matrix
A B
A
B
(
a b
c d
)
.
Here we assume 0 < a, b, c, d < 1. A player uses either strategy A or B. The fitness
of players A and B with i neighbors with the same strategy (A and B, respectively)
is given by
fA(i) = 1− w + w
(
a
i
z
+ b
z − i
z
)
, fB(i) = 1− w + w
(
c
z − i
z
+ d
i
z
)
,
where w is a parameter that measures the intensity of selection.1)
Let us assume the following update rule for evolutionary dynamics. At each time
step, with probability 1−q, reproduction process occurs as follows. (i) An individual
is selected at random with a probability proportional to its fitness. (ii) The selected
individual is duplicated and it replaces a random neighbor. With probability q,
a diffusion process occurs as follows. (i) Two neighboring players are selected at
random. (ii) Their locations are exchanged. The parameter q, which is between 0
and 1, measures the intensity of the mobility of players. In the limit q → 1, the
dynamics becomes well mixed.
§3. Random regular graphs
First, we present the theoretical results for random regular graphs obtained with
the pair approximation. Let X and Y be the following conditional probabilities:
X = pAA/pA, Y = pBB/pB. (3.1)
Here, p∗ is the concentration of player ∗, and p∗∗ represents the doublet density of
two neighboring players. We have pA = pAA + pAB/2 and pB = pBB + pAB/2. In
the pair approximation, the system can be described by the two variables X and Y
alone:
pA =
1− Y
2−X − Y
,
pB =
1−X
2−X − Y
,
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pAA =
X(1− Y )
2−X − Y
, (3.2)
pAB =
2(1−X)(1 − Y )
2−X − Y
,
pBB =
Y (1−X)
2−X − Y
.
The probability that a player A has i neighbors with strategy A is given by
pA(i) =
(
z
i
)
Xi(1−X)z−i.
The strategy A replaces the strategy B only if the player selected to reproduce is A
and the replaced neighbor is B. The probability that this event occurs is given by
PB→A =
pA
Φ
z∑
i=0
z − i
z
fA(i)pA(i)
=
pAB
2Φ
{1− w + w[b+ (1− 1/z)(a − b)X]} ,
(3.3)
where we have used Eqs. (3.1) and (3.2) to derive the final part. Here Φ is a nor-
malization constant, which is given by the average fitness over all individuals:
Φ = 1− w + w{pA[b+ (a− b)X] + pB[c+ (d− c)Y ]}. (3.4)
In the same way, the probability that the strategy B replaces the strategy A is given
by
PA→B =
pAB
2Φ
{1−w + w[c+ (1− 1/z)(d − c)Y ]} . (3.5)
From Eqs. (3.3) and (3.5), we obtain
p˙A =
pAB
2Φ
w[b− c+ (1− 1/z)(a − b)X − (1− 1/z)(d − c)Y ]. (3.6)
The necessary condition for equilibrium is p˙A = 0. This condition is simplified as
(a− b)X + (c− d)Y =
c− b
1− 1/z
(3.7)
From Eqs. (3.3), (3.4), (3.5) and (3.7), we obtain the following approximate relation:
PB→A = PA→B = pAB/2 +O(w/z). (3.8)
In addition, through the reproduction process, the rate of change of the doublet
density is given by
PAB→AA = [1 + (z − 1)(1 − Y )]PB→A
PAA→AB = (z − 1)XPA→B .
(3.9)
Here, we have used the fact that the replaced player has z− 1 neighbors, other than
the player selected to reproduce. Then, through the diffusion process, the rate of
change of the doublet density is given by
P ′AB→AA = (z − 1)(1 − Y )pAB,
P ′AA→AB = (z − 1)XpAB . (3.10)
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Fig. 1. The density pA of player A plotted as a function of the degree z for a random regular graph
(a) q = 0, (b) q = 0.2. The game parameters are set as b = 0.1, 0.2, 0.3 and 0.4 from bottom
to top for fixed a = 0.7, c = 1, d = 0 and w = 0.5. The total number of players is fixed to
10000. In all simulations, pA is obtained by averaging over the last 10,000 time steps after the
first 10,000 ones, and each data point results from 10 different network realizations. The curves
represent the theoretical predictions (3.13).
Here, we have used the fact that each node of the doublet has z − 1 links excluding
the link between the doublet. We have
p˙AA = (1− q)PAB→AA + qP
′
AB→AA − (1− q)PAA→AB − qP
′
AA→AB. (3.11)
The equilibrium state must satisfy p˙AA = 0. Using Eqs. (3.8), (3.9) and (3.10), we
obtain
X + Y = 1 +
1− q
(1 + q)(z − 1)
(3.12)
This result is an approximation valid for qw/z ≪ 1 . The equilibrium values of X
and Y are obtained by solving eqs. (3.7) and (3.12). From Eq. (3.2), the equilibrium
density of player A is given by
pA∗ =
b− d
c− a+ b− d
−
c− a− b+ d+ q(c+ a− b− d)
(c− a+ b− d)[(1 + q)z − 2]
(3.13)
The stability is determined by calculating the Jacobi matrix of the dynamics of X
and Y from (3.6) and (3.11). After using (3.8) and some algebra, we obtain that if
c − a+ b − d > 0 and 0 < pA∗ < 1 then pA∗ is stable. The results are summarized
in Table I.
For example, when c > a and b > d (the chicken game), the equilibrium pA∗
is stable for large z (see the first and second rows in Table I). When c < a and
b < d (the assurance game), the equilibrium pA∗ is unstable and thus the density
of players should approach to 0 or 1, depending on the initial conditions (see the
third and fourth rows in Table I). Furthermore, when b < d < a < c (the prisoner’s
dilemma game), either pA∗ < 0 (see the fifth row in Table I) or pA∗ > 1 (see the
ninth row in Table I). Thus, all players should use strategy B (i.e. uncooperative
behavior) ultimately and strategy A (i.e. cooperative behavior) is never sustainable.
In the limit z →∞, Eq. (3.13) approaches (b− d)/(c− a+ b− d), which is the Nash
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Table I. Equilibrium and its stability. The solid and dotted curves indicate stable and un-
stable equilibrium, respectively. Here, we have z0 =
c−a+b−d+q(c+a−b−d)
(b−d)(1+q)
and z1 =
c−a+b−d−q(c+a−b−d)
(c−a)(1+q)
.
c− a b− d c− a+ b− d c− a− b+ d equilibrium
+q(c+ a− b− d)
+ + + +
z
z
pA
0
+ + + −
z
z
pA
1
− − − +
z
z
pA
1
− − − −
z
z
pA
0
+ − + + z
pA
+ − + − z
pA
z
z
1
0
− + + + z
pA
z
z
1
0
− + + − z
pA
+ − − + z
pA
+ − − − z
pA
z
z
1
0
− + − + z
pA
z
z
1
0
− + − − z
pA
equilibrium in conventional game theory. In the limit q → 1, Eq. (3.13) corresponds
to the mean-field approximation. Note that the mean-field approximation does not
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coincide with the Nash equilibrium, because the number of opponent players is re-
stricted. Figure 1 shows that this approximation agrees very well with the numerical
simulations.
§4. Degree fluctuation
Let us now consider the case in which the degree is not uniform but exhibits a
distribution ρ(k). Then, the average degree is written
z = 〈k〉 =
∑
k
kρ(k). (4.1)
In this case, we need to extend the pair approximation. Here, we do not take
degree correlation into account. Furthermore, we assume that the density pA and
the conditional probabilities X and Y do not depend on the degree. Without this
assumption, the relation (3.2) no longer hold, and thus we need more than two
variables to describe the system. Although three variables (e.g. pA, pAA and pAB)
are often used to account for the dependence of pA on the degree,
17), 18) the outcome
is too complicated to give clear insight. In addition, the approximation with three
variables yields results that are quantitatively similar to the approximation with
two variables, because the dependence of pA on the degree is weak, as seen below.
Accordingly, we adopt the approximation with two variables X and Y .
If a link is selected at random, the distribution of the degree of the nodes to
which the particular link leads is not ρ(k) but rather kρ(k).22), 23) Thus, the average
degree of the player replaced in the reproduction process and the two players of the
exchanged doublet in the diffusion process is given by∑
k k
2ρ(k)∑
k kρ(k)
=
〈k2〉
〈k〉
. (4.2)
In this case, we should use (4.2) instead of z in (3.9) and (3.10) to calculate the
equilibrium. As a result, instead of (3.12), we have
X + Y = 1 +
1− q
(1 + q)(〈k2〉/〈k〉 − 1)
. (4.3)
Equation (4.3) can be obtained by substituting the effective mobility
q′ = q +
1− q2
κ+ q
(4.4)
for q in (3.12), where κ = (〈k2〉 + 〈k〉2 − 2〈k〉)/(〈k2〉 − 〈k〉2). The parameter κ is
larger than 1 for z = 〈k〉 > 2, and thus it decreases with the variance of the degree
distribution. It is obvious that the additional part, (1−q2)/(κ+q), in (4.4) is positive
(because 0 < q < 1) and a decreasing function of κ. Consequently, increasing the
variance of the degree is equivalent to increasing the mobility, q.
For examples, we consider Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graphs and Baraba´si-Albert
scale-free networks. For Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graphs, the degree follows a Pois-
son distribution, ρ(k) = e−zzk/k!, which leads to 〈k2〉 = z(z + 1). Thus, we obtain
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Fig. 2. The density of player A is plotted as a function of the average degree z for Erdo˝s-Re´nyi
random graphs (a) and for Baraba´si-Albert scale-free networks (b). The curves represent the
theoretical prediction. Here q = 0, and the other parameters are the same as Fig. 1.
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Fig. 3. The density pA of player A and the con-
ditional probabilities X and Y are plotted
as functions of the degree k for Baraba´si-
Albert scale-free networks. Here a = 0.7,
b = 0.4, c = 1, d = 0, w = 0.5, q = 0 and
z = 4. The curves are a guide for the eyes.
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Fig. 4. The density of player A is plotted as
a function of the clustering coefficient C for
networks whose nodes have fixed degree z =
4. Here q = 0 and the other parameters are
the same as Fig. 1.
κ = 2z − 1. For Baraba´si-Albert scale-free networks, the degree follows a power law
distribution, ρ(k) ∝ k−γ , with the exponent γ = 3. In this case, 〈k2〉 ≃ z2 logN/4 is
obtained at leading order.24) Thus, we obtain κ = (z logN +4z − 8)/(z logN − 4z).
In the limit N →∞, we have q′ → 1, which means that the result approaches that
of the mean-field approximation. For Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graphs, the theory agrees
well with the numerical simulations [see Fig. 2(a)]. For Baraba´si-Albert scale-free
networks, however, the agreement is not so good [see Fig. 2(b)]. This deviation
mainly results from the fact that we ignored dependence of X and Y on the degree
in this approximation. Figure 3 shows the numerical result, where pA appears to
be independent of the degree k, but X and Y decrease with k. Thus, a node with
smaller degree tends to have homogeneous neighbors.
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§5. Clustering effect
We now turn to a study of the clustering effect. For simplicity, we return to the
case in which the degree is uniform. To this point, we have used network with a
very small clustering coefficient. The clustering coefficient quantifies the probability
that two vertices that are connected to the same node are also connected.25) Thus, a
network with a large clustering coefficient has many triangles, i.e., loop-like triplets.
Ingnoring the triplet correlation without pair correlation biases, we assume that the
density of three players on a triangle follows Kirkwood superposition approxima-
tion:26)–28)
pAAB : pABB ∼
pAAp
2
AB
p2ApB
:
p2ABpBB
pAp2B
= X : Y.
Note that in the original Kirkwood superposituon approximation, the normalization
condition is violated.
Recall that the configuration of strategies changes only if two neighboring players
have different strategies (i.e. A and B). The probability that these two neighboring
players and another neighbor of one of them compose a triangle is given by C. In
this case, the probabilities that the third player is A and B are pAAB and pABB ,
respectively. Accordingly, instead of X and Y in Eqs. (3.7) and (3.12), we should
use
X ′ = X(1− C) + C
X
X + Y
, Y ′ = Y (1− C) + C
Y
X + Y
. (5.1)
Here we should note that a pair of configurations pAAB and pABB are normalized. In
other studies, all configurations pAAA, pAAB, pABB and pBBB have been normalized
for similar approximations.18), 28) Our approximation is better.
The formulation obtained using the replacement (5.1) can be also obtained by
substituting z′ and q′ for z and q in (3.7) and (3.12) as follows:
q′ = q
{
1−
(1− q2)(z − 1)
(z − 2)q + z
C +O(C2)
}
,
z′ = z
{
1−
(1− q)(z − 1)
(z − 2)q + z
C +O(C2)
}
.
Thus, an increase of the clustering coefficient is equivalent to a decrease of z and q.
In particular, when q = 0, this substitution is simplified exactly as
z′ = z − C(z − 1) (5.2)
In this case, the clustering effect is equivalent to the effect of decreasing the number
z of neighbors. We present numerical results in Fig. 4. Here, to introduce the
clustering structure into the random regular graphs, we used the edge exchange
method.21) In this method, two links are selected randomly, and they are rewired
only when the new network configuration is connected and has a larger clustering
coefficient. Figure 4 shows that our approximation agrees well with the numerical
simulations. The deviation seen in the region of large C may be due to the fact that
we ignored the effect from loops with more than three nodes.
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§6. Summary
In conclusion, we have studied the network effect in general 2× 2 game by using
the pair approximation. First, for random regular graphs, our theoretical results
are presented in (3.13) and Table I. Then, by the extended pair approximation, we
developed a theory for networks with degree fluctuation and networks with large
clustering. It was found that a fluctuation of the degree has the same effect as an
increase in the mobility q, and a clustering structure has the same effect as a decrease
in the number z of neighbors. Real social networks are more complex than the
networks used in our numerical simulations, because they have degree correlation,29)
hierarchy and community structures.30) We believe our method will be useful as a
first step in analyzing such complicated situations. Furthermore, many other update
rules for evolutionary dynamics are proposed.3), 6) Some behavior seen in this paper
depend on the update rule. The investigation of the dependence on the update rule
is a future project.
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